

Message Text

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FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1877

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0107

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652 XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV MINI- PLENARY STATEMENT, MARCH 20, 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT
PRESENTED BY MINISTER SEMENOV, TUESDAY,
MARCH 20, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 20, 1973

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND NO UNI-
LATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES,
FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS.

HISTORY TEACHES THAT ADHERENCE TO THIS PRINCIPLE IS
IMPORTANT FOR EFFECTIVE MAINTENANCE OF GENUINE SECURITY OF
BOTH SIDES AND FOR WORLD PEACE. ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT OF
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BY ONE OF THE SIDES HAS IN NO WAY
BEEN EQUIVALENT TO AN INCREASE OF ITS SECURITY. NOW ALL, EVEN
FORMER ADVOCATES OF SUCH A POLICY, RECOGNIZE THAT THE SECURITY
OF THE SIDE WHICH ASSUMED THE INITIATIVE IN UNLEASHING SUCH A
RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, DID NOT INCREASE. THE VERY
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FACT THAT THEY ENTERED INTO THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS WAS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY THE SIDES THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF STRENGTHENING THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY AND WORLD PEACE IT WAS ADVISABLE AND NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT A POLICY OF AGREED LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IT IS EVIDENT THAT ALL THIS MUST BE KEPT IN MIND NOW, TOO, WHEN WE DISCUSS THE FOUNDATION FOR A FUTURE PERMANENT UNDERSTANDING ON LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN HELSINKI AND IN VIENNA IT WAS CORRECTLY STATED THAT THE SO- CALLED " CONSERVATIVE APPROACH" IS UNSUITED TO SUCH A SPHERE. THIS CANNOT BUT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AT OUR MOST RESPONSIBLE NEW STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL.

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE- MENTIONED PRINCIPLE FIXED CERTAIN QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, TOOK VARIOUS FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT IN ESTABLISHING THESE LIMITATIONS. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ALSO ESTABLISHES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT WITHIN THE FRAME- WORK OF THE LIMITATIONS ADOPTED.

IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT IN THE CIRCLES WHICH WERE IN FAVOR OF THE BANKRUPT COLD WAR POLICY SPECULATIONS WERE EXPRESSED AS TO WHETHER ONE COULD NOT BREAK THROUGH TO A HIGHER PLATEAU BY MAKING USE OF TECHNOLOGICAL OR OTHER FACTORS AND CONTINUE THE POLICY OF A RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT IS OBVIOUS, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH CALCULATIONS HAVE NO REAL BASIS IN FACT, NOT TO MENTION THAT A BUILD- UP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WILL IN NO WAY LEAD TO INCREASING GENUINE SECURITY. THEREFORE THE IDEA OF ACCUMULATING NUCLEAR AND MISSILE MIGHT FOR THE SAKE OF " OVERKILL" IS IRRATIONAL.

CONCLUSION OF THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREE- MENT REFLECTS THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION, DEMONSTRATES THE CONSOLIDATION OF POSITIONS OF REALISM AND OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN SOVIET- AMERICAN RELATIONS. OF COURSE, ASSERTING THE NEW APPROACH TO MAJOR POLICY QUESTIONS AT TIMES MEETS WITH DIFFICULTIES DUE TO THE DEVOTION OF CERTAIN CIRCLES TO OLD CONCEPTS OF TIMES PAST. IF I UNDERSTAND CORRECTLY, THERE ARE NO DISAGREEMENTS HERE ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, EVEN
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THOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENT OPINIONS AND NUANCES OF OPINIONS

ON SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION.

THE CONTINUED INTEREST OF THE SIDES IN CURBING THE STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE IS BEYOND DOUBT. BOTH SIDES ARE EVIDENTLY
EQUALLY INTERESTED IN WORKING OUT A MORE COMPLETE PERMANENT
AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF THESE ARMAMENTS.

AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WHAT IS ADEQUATE
FOR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS INADEQUATE FOR A PERMANENT
AGREEMENT. ATTEMPTS TO REDUCE THE SOLUTION TO CERTAIN VERY
SIMPLE GROUPS OF FIGURES, AND T
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0107

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

TERRITORY. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THIS IS FOR ALL PRACTICAL
PURPOSES EQUIVALENT TO INCREASING THE NUMBER OF BALLISTIC
MISSILE SUBMARINES OF ONE OF THE SIDES. THE INFLUENCE UPON
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION OF ONE SIDE'S HAVING SUCH BASES IS
ESPECIALLY PRONOUNCED DUE TO THE DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC
SITUATION OF THE SIDES AND CANNOT BUT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE ARE ENGAGED.
IN THIS CONNECTION, MR. AMBASSADOR, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW
YOUR ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE OF MAY 26,
1972 TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF MODERN
BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES PROVIDED FOR IN THE INTERIM
AGREEMENT ONLY PARTIALLY COMPENSATES FOR THE STRATEGIC
IMBALANCE IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NUCLEAR- POWERED MISSILE
SUBMARINES OF THE USSR AND THE U. S.

WITHDRAWAL OF BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES BEYOND AGREED
LIMITS AND LIQUIDATION OF CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORY

OF THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STABILIZING THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND STRENGTHENING TRUST BETWEEN THE SIDES, WOULD ELIMINATE CERTAIN STIMULI FOR THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE AND WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY FACILITATE THE SOLUTION OF OTHER PROBLEMS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCE THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION ALSO INCLUDE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT ENABLES THEM TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT MOVEMENT BY ONE OF THE SIDES OF ITS NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TOWARD THE BORDERS OF THE OTHER SIDE EXPANDS THE GROUP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS SUBJECT TO CONSIDERATION AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SECURITY OF A STATE, IT MAKES NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE SPECIFICALLY WHICH NUCLEAR ATTACK SYSTEMS CAN BE USED TO STRIKE TARGETS ON ITS TERRITORY. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT WOULD BE UNNATURAL TO EXCLUDE FROM CONSIDERATION THE PRESENCE ON ONE SIDE OF SEVERAL THOUSAND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TOGETHER WITH THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, DEPLOYED ON BASES LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES, IN IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY TO THE BORDERS OF THE OTHER SIDE. THEREFORE THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ALL ITS TOTALITY ON A LONG- TERM BASIS IS ORGANICALLY LINKED TO RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING FORWARD- BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TO NATIONAL TERRITORIES AND LIQUIDATING CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES.

TO FIND A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT BASED ON ATTACK CARRIERS WHICH IN ESSENCE CARRY OUT THE FUNCTIONS OF LOADING AIRFIELDS.

CONSIDERATIONS SOMETIMES EXPRESSED CONCERNING THE RELATIVELY SHORT RANGE OF CARRIER- BASED AIRCRAFT AS COMPARED TO STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND THEIR ALLEGED CONSEQUENT LIMITED CAPABILITIES TO CARRY OUT COMBAT MISSIONS ARE NOT CONVINCING, IF ONLY BECAUSE THE LIMITED RANGE OF CARRIER- BASED AIRCRAFT IS COMPENSATED FOR BY THE PRACTICALLY UNLIMITED CRUISING RANGE OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS THEMSELVES. IN THIS CONNECTION, WITHDRAWAL OF ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS BEYOND AGREED LIMITS WOULD BE A STABILIZING FACTOR IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

CONSIDERING THAT MODERN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS HAVE GREAT
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MOBILITY, THE NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM MUST
BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE COMPOSITION OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
WEAPONS WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO LIMITATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN
UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES, REGARDLESS OF THE
GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT OF ATTACK CARRIERS WITH NUCLEAR DELIVERY
AIRCRAFT ABOARD. SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING MUST PROVIDE FOR
LIMITATION OF THE NUMBER OF ATTACK CARRIERS AND THE NUCLEAR
DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE AS WELL
AS WHAT WE BELIEVE TO BE THE MUTUAL DESIRE OF THE SIDES FOR
JOINT ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND
INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, THE SOVIET SIDE
PROPOSES:

1) TO WITHDRAW BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES BEYOND AGREED
LIMITS BY AN AGREED DATE TOGETHER WITH SIMULTANEOUS LIQUIDATION
OF FORWARD SUBMARINE BASES ON THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES;

2) TO WITHDRAW BY AN AGREED DATE TO THEIR OWN NATIONAL
TERRITORIES NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT AND ANY MISSILES WITH
NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHOSE GEOGRAPHIC DEPLOYMENT ENABLES THEM
TO STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND TO
LIQUIDATE CORRESPONDING BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES;

3) TO WITHDRAW ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIERS BEYOND AGREED LIMITS,
PLACING AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM OUT OF RANGE OF THE TERRITORY OF
THE OTHER SIDE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE NUMBER OF ATTACK CARRIERS
AND NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THEM WOULD BE LIMITED TO
AGREED LEVELS FOR BOTH SIDES.

THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE PROPOSALS
SET FORTH ABOVE, BEING CLEAR, ARE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE GOALS
OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS AND WIL
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